Undermining Putin

These states — Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia — now have plans to create a 2,000-mile stretch of mined areas as part of a defensive effort against any possible attack from Russia.

The move to create such minefields comes as the result of both a recognition of the perceived growing threat from Russia and of the important defensive effect — as proved during the current Ukraine war — that both anti-personnel (AP) and anti-tank (AT) landmines can generate.

AT mines are not covered by the Ottawa treaty and all countries are free to use them. AT mines target only vehicles (the weight of a human cannot set them off). The main issue with AP mines, which target humans, is that they can be set off by civilians as well as soldiers.

As such, they are deemed to be not only indiscriminate weapons but also those whose “persistence” means that they can remain a danger long after any conflict is over. Their banning is seen by many as an “ethical imperative”.

In the current era of military development dominated by the introduction of high-tech weapons systems, it appears that the low-tech, unsophisticated and relatively cheap landmine — which can be laid in their millions — can have a significant role to play in modern warfare.

Minefields have proved very effective as a defensive tool in the current Ukraine war because of their ability to disrupt enemy assaults. This recognition has, for these five NATO states, meant that their adherence to the Ottawa treaty had to end, despite its grounding in humanitarian concerns.

These five states have been criticised by human rights organisations for withdrawing from the treaty. The UK was also a signatory in 1997 and still remains bound by its stipulations. The US, Russia and China didn’t sign in the first place.

Landmines have proved a significant defensive tool in the Ukraine war. In the initial days of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Ukrainian side was very quick to deploy some of its stockpile of Soviet-era AT mines.

These were very effective in restricting the early advance of Russian armoured columns (the term “armour” covering both tanks and other armoured vehicles) on Kyiv. These mines created disruption as Russian forces were either stopped or had to find other routes around the minefields.

The delays allowed time for Ukrainian forces to set up firm defensive positions that eventually halted the Russian columns and led to their being turned back before reaching Kyiv.

Ukrainian forces then launched their own armoured offensive in the summer of 2023. These forces, by now trained and equipped by NATO states and using trademark NATO combined arms manoeuvre warfare techniques, were also held up in dense Russian minefields. Their advance ground to a halt.

The presence of vast fields of both AP and AT mines meant that the supposedly war-winning principle of “manoeuvre warfare”, which relies on movement, initiative and surprise, and which the Ukrainians had been taught by NATO instructors, became impossible to conduct. The Russians call their defensive minefields “insurmountable”.

Given the power of minefields, both sides came ultimately to understand that their presence had to mean a rethink of how the war should be conducted. Mines led to a change in tactics.

Both sides had to adopt much more attritional approaches. Outcomes would now largely be dictated by the weight of artillery fire and not by manoeuvre. It is minefields that form the basis for the Ukrainian forces’ “fortress belt” across much of the Donbas region.

Despite Kyiv having itself signed the Ottawa treaty in 2005, it was clear that its forces were making considerable use of banned AP mines along with the “legal” AT mines.

Ukraine only officially withdrew from Ottawa in June this year. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky justified the withdrawal on the basis that “antipersonnel mines … very often have no alternative as a tool for defence”.

The Russian defensive arrangements like those of Ukrainian forces make considerable use of mines. The Russian side is able to draw on what is perceived to be the world’s largest stockpile of, in particular, AP mines (said to amount to some 26.5 million). Zelensky has accused Russia of using AP mines “with extreme cynicism”, referring to the alleged booby trapping of dead Russian soldiers with AP mines.

What is interesting here is that the very old technology of landmines is being combined with the far newer one of drones. Minefields can now be laid far more efficiently by using drones to plant them rather than, as has been the norm, by hand. The drones have changed how mine warfare is carried out.

Given what is happening in Ukraine, it is now well understood that mines can do more than help decide the course of mere tactical military engagements; they can create strategic outcomes. They can, in essence, decide the outcome of wars.

It is with this understanding in mind that these five NATO states have withdrawn from the Ottawa treaty. AP mines are patently needed on today’s battlefields. They are seen as an essential addition to the AT mines. Each type has their defensive role to play.

As such, these five states are now seeking to both procure their own AP mines domestically and to source them from the US. Somewhat controversially, the administration of former US president Joe Biden had already taken a decision, just before Donald Trump became president, to supply Ukraine with considerable numbers of “non-persistent” AP mines. At the time, Kyiv was still a signatory to Ottawa.

AP and AT mines have both proved themselves to be essential tools of modern warfare. Today, the war in Ukraine is characterised and dominated, due to the presence of mines, by defence and not offence. Frontlines are largely static. Humble, cheap and simple they may be, but landmines do, it seems, have a crucial role to play in modern warfare.

Rod Thornton is a senior lecturer in International Studies, Defence and Security at King’s College London. Marina Miron is a postdoctoral researcher at the War Studies Department at King’s College London.

This article was first published in The Conversation. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe.

<iframe src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/266181/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-advanced" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important" referrerpolicy="no-referrer-when-downgrade"></iframe>