Now or never

Earlier this year, many Europeans hoped they could keep the US on side by purchasing more American weapons and liquefied natural gas. They have even shown that they can work together to handle Trump, as they did following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s catastrophic Oval Office meeting, and again following Trump’s chummy meeting with Putin in Anchorage. But zoom out a bit and you will see that European diplomats have been swimming upstream. Regardless of how much energy they put in, the tide is against them in the US, in Russia, and even in Ukraine.

In the US, their luck will run out sooner or later, simply because Trump’s core interests are antithetical to their own. His closest MAGA advisers and hangers-on have three overarching goals: to force a “peace” at any price; to normalise relations with Russia in order to profit from the resulting business opportunities; and to bring US troops back to the Western hemisphere. Some European leaders have been in denial about this agenda, but following the release of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, they no longer have any excuse.

Meanwhile, Putin’s sacrifice of Russian blood and treasure shows that he remains firmly committed to the war effort. Now that he has rewired the machinery of state and the broader economy for conquest, Russia produces several times as much ammunition as Ukraine every year. It can outproduce Ukraine in drones, and it is introducing new technologies, like glide bombs, that are difficult to defend against. And on the diplomatic front, Putin’s strategy to “keep the Europeans out, Americans in, and the Ukrainians down”, to quote a Russian close to the regime who spoke to me anonymously, is paying off, judging by Trump’s increasing pressure on Zelensky to accept unfavourable terms.

Most importantly, the Ukrainian public, which has shown incredible bravery since the very first hour of the war, may now be approaching the limits of what it can tolerate. Military aid, in dollar terms, to Ukraine fell by 43% in July and August this year, and the Ukrainian army is facing acute manpower shortages amid growing public resistance to conscription. Moreover, the country’s domestic politics are in turmoil, owing to a corruption scandal that has toppled Zelensky’s powerful chief of staff, Andriy Yermak.

Even if Europeans manage to avert the worst-case scenario in the near term, they should be thinking about how they can prevent disaster in the longer term. Rather than only preparing for the next horror show from Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev, the US and Russian envoys, respectively, they should be drafting their own plans and making it clear that they are the true party of peace.

The first step is to mobilise Russia’s frozen assets, which are sufficient to provide Ukraine with financial support for at least the next two years. This is the main source of European leverage over both Russia and the US, and even Ukraine, but unedifying arguments with Belgium, where the funds are technically held, on the issue have made Europe look bungling and weak, and ultimately resulted in Europe failing to reach a deal on using Russian funds on Thursday.

Once fresh loans to Ukraine are in place, European leaders should not squander their momentum. The Ukrainians cannot sustain many more months, let alone years, of attritional war. They must ask themselves how they want the war to end. What, realistically, is the best-case outcome for next year?

For Europe, getting serious means high-level discussions about what credible security guarantees could look like. At a minimum, there will need to be a snapback mechanism for sanctions, financing, and weapons deliveries in the event that Russia attacks again. At the same time, Europe must be willing to talk to the Russians directly, especially if Trump tires of the process and walks away.

The Trump administration’s recent 28-point plan understandably came as a shock, given how much it seemed designed to exploit Ukraine’s vulnerabilities. But it did flesh out some of the key areas that any serious peace plan will have to address, including questions of territory, NATO membership, protections for minorities within Ukraine, security guarantees, and possible limits on Ukraine’s armed forces.

Obviously, Europeans must make it crystal clear that the continued existence of a democratic, sovereign, and secure Ukraine is non-negotiable. But other questions will require difficult compromises. Though they will never recognise Russia’s occupation, they will have to accept Russia’s de facto control of some Ukrainian territory. Similarly, NATO membership for Ukraine would seem to be a non-starter. In any case, European leaders should already be working privately with the Ukrainians to establish a framework for a sustainable peace.

Since an unjust outcome could simply be a prelude to more war, this remains an existential issue for Ukraine. But it is an existential issue for Europe as well. If European leaders can finally get their act together, they will have far more credibility with which to face down US tariffs or Chinese economic blackmail. But if they fail, they will signal to everyone that they remain weak and feckless, and the scramble for Europe will begin.

This article was first published by Project Syndicate. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe.