Under pressure

If it does so, it will also be giving up the strategic positions that have prevented major advances by the Russian military for many months now. This is the significant line of defensive fortifications across Donbas, known as the Donbas line. It’s Ukraine’s equivalent to the Maginot line of forts which were France’s main line of defence against Germany before World War II.

The “Anchorage formula” agreed by US President Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Alaska last year calls for Ukrainian forces to abandon the areas of western Donbas they currently hold. Washington is now talking up the idea of establishing a free economic zone or demilitarised zone which would cover the whole of Donbas, including those portions currently occupied by Russian forces.

This would mean Ukraine abandoning the Donbas line. The system integrates at least seven distinct defensive layers that any attacking force must penetrate sequentially to achieve effect.

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Going to cede

Restitution of lost territory can take decades and is only realistic in certain geopolitical circumstances

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Going to cede

Restitution of lost territory can take decades and is only realistic in certain geopolitical circumstances

These include minefields, anti-tank ditches, anti-tank obstacles (“dragons’ teeth”), bunkers, trench lines and anti-drone defences. Such obstacles can either physically halt assaulting Russian forces or “canalise” them into swampy or otherwise impassible ground or into pre-arranged kill zones, wherein fires (mortar and artillery) can be used to destroy Russian formations.

One of the most critical lines runs through the embattled town of Pokrovsk, which has been under constant Russian assault since early 2025. Lose Pokrovsk and the Ukrainians will then more than likely also lose the important city of Donetsk. Thus Pokrovsk has been referred to as the “gateway to Donetsk”.

The Donbas line took years to build and to perfect. It is very sophisticated. It would be a massive strategic blow for the Ukrainians if they were forced to give it up and pull back.

In essence, the Russian demand that Ukrainian forces vacate western Donbas can also be seen as a demand that they likewise give up, in the shape of this Donbas line, their one true means of protecting not only western Donbas but also, arguably, the whole of the rest of Ukraine.

If Kyiv were to accede to Russian demands and abandon the Donbas line, then this would only help bring about a lasting peace if, of course, trust could be placed in the Russians to keep their side of the bargain. They would need to cease all their assaults across Ukraine and themselves “de-militarise” the area of eastern Donbas they currently control.

But Putin has a history of reneging on deals. Anything agreed now by Kyiv in Abu Dhabi is likely, as respected Washington-based think tank the Institute for the Study of War points out, to suffer the same fate. This seems to certainly be the view of many on the Ukrainian side.

As Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, himself recently put it, “I don’t trust Putin”. He has good reason for doubting the Russian president’s bona fides. After all, Russia was, alongside the US, UK and France, a signatory to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, by which those powers provided assurances for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for Kyiv giving up its arsenal of nuclear weapons.

This didn’t stop Russia invading. Nor did the 2014 and 2015 Minsk accords, which aimed to stop the fighting between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military in Donbas.

In the event of any peace deal being struck between Moscow and Kyiv, Ukraine’s Western allies have offered what they are calling “robust security guarantees”. These would be provided by a “coalition of the willing” made up of more than 30 countries, mainly from within Europe.

In terms of what these promises might actually mean, there is a proposal for a three-tier mechanism. A Russian breach of the ceasefire would initially trigger a diplomatic warning, as well as allowing Ukraine to respond militarily.

The second tier would be provided by the coalition of the willing, primarily the UK and France, which plan to send troops to Ukraine as part of the deal, but also many EU members plus Norway, Iceland and Türkiye.

The third tier would be a military response from the US. But it’s been reported that the US has made its participation in any security guarantees contingent on the agreement of a ceasefire deal which gives Russia control of the entire Donbas region.

A further issue here is that Moscow is unlikely to agree to the presence of any NATO troops as official security guarantors in Ukraine. Moscow has said as much, insisting that any foreign troops in Ukraine would be a “legitimate target”.

Would Western governments really commit their troops to a situation where they might become targets — leading perhaps to a wider war?

The whole idea of Ukraine abandoning its Donbas line is fraught with difficulties. For this is not just a question of Ukraine trading land for peace. It is more fundamentally a question of trading land and significant defensive lines for the promise of peace.

The original version of the Maginot line did not save France in 1940. It was bypassed by German forces moving through Belgium to outflank the Maginot fortifications. The danger for Ukraine is that its own Maginot line could itself be bypassed if it accedes to Russian demands at the negotiating table in Abu Dhabi.

Can Zelensky really give up the Donbas line that is protecting his entire country and can he really rely on security guarantees from Western states that may yet prove equivocal? As one Ukrainian official told Reuters recently, to give up remaining positions in the Donbas region would be “suicide”.

Rod Thornton is a senior lecturer in international studies, defence and security, at King’s College London. Marina Miron is a postdoctoral researcher, War Studies Department, King’s College London

This article was first published by The Conversation. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe.