A marked man

Aside from the laundry list of high-ranking Russian military officials the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has methodically managed to eliminate since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began over three years ago, an October 2024 drone strike on the Gudermes Special Forces University a mere two months after Vladimir Putin’s landmark visit to the institution was a major wake-up call for Kadyrov that made him realise he is not off-limits either.

To further expose the sorry state of Chechnya’s air defence systems, Grozny’s city centre was targeted in multiple Ukrainian drone strikes in December, including ones on the Chechen Interior Ministry’s Second Regiment and the riot police headquarters. There is no denying that Kadyrov painted a target on his back and rendered himself fair game by not just dispatching over 47,000 combatants to the frontline in Ukraine, but also threatening to use Ukrainian prisoners of war as human shields in the event of future airstrikes on Chechnya.

Having been blacklisted by the US, UK and EU, one of the few safe jurisdictions for Kadyrov in retirement would be the United Arab Emirates, where he has operated an unofficial Chechen “embassy” for more than a decade. The UAE is also where Kadyrov is believed to have stashed away his personal fortune, and the fact that he is known to have travelled there at least 14 times between 2021 and 2022 alone suggests that he began hatching his escape plan during the buildup to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Given the degree to which Chechnya’s dynastic and feudal governance model mirrors that of the UAE, his personal rapport with the Emirati President Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan should come as no real surprise. Despite styling himself “Putin’s foot soldier”, Kadyrov is equally unswerving in his allegiance to the UAE leader, whom he considers a “dear elder brother” and a de facto guarantor of his stranglehold over the troubled Muslim-majority North Caucasus republic.

Earmarking over $300 million for Chechen start-ups via the Zayed Fund for Entrepreneurship and Innovation speaks volumes about Abu Dhabi’s determination to empower and entrench a like-minded theocracy in Grozny. As a result of the Kremlin abandoning Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad to his fate in December and leaving Iran’s top brass high and dry amid intense Israeli bombardment two weeks ago, Kadyrov harbours no illusions about Moscow sending in the cavalry if ever his regime is imperilled.

Spending time in Dubai or Abu Dhabi is arguably Kadyrov’s best bet to keep himself out of harm’s way. Neither the SBU nor his ill-wishers within the Russian intelligence apparatus would run the risk of assassinating him on Emirati soil and the diplomatic crisis that would ensue if the operation went awry.

These days Kadyrov uses any excuse to jet off to the tiny oil-rich federation for peace of mind, whether it be the wedding of a senior Emirati diplomat’s son, the funeral of a fairly unknown royal family member or the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix. When it comes to succession planning, Kadyrov could follow in the footsteps of ex-Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev and serve as a UAE-based éminence grise after passing the torch to an inner circle confidante such as Apti Alaudinov, the commander of the Akhmat special forces unit, or his pampered teenage son Adam.

Much like the corrupt Nazarbayev clan did in Kazakhstan until a popular uprising in 2022, members of Kadyrov’s immediate family have all taken advantage of Dubai’s lax anti-money laundering regulations to amass a luxury property empire with their ill-gotten gains and pursue other lucrative ventures in the Middle East’s commercial hub.

According to the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, the Chechen head’s first cousin Shakruddi Edilgiriev snapped up four villas worth $20 million in Dubai’s plush Palm Jumeirah neighbourhood in 2022–23. Meanwhile, Firdaws, the halal clothing line co-founded by his wife Medni and daughter Aishat, has held regular fashion shows in Dubai since 2012.

That said, being able to purchase high-end real estate or prize-winning racehorses in cash is not the UAE’s only draw from Kadyrov’s perspective. As is the case in Chechnya, there is no separation of mosque and state throughout the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the intergovernmental bloc comprising Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. Rather, Sharia-inspired lèse-majesté laws reign supreme such that the local authorities maintain a zero-tolerance approach toward dissent or criticism, women live under a male guardianship system, public displays of affection are illegal and alcohol consumption is strictly policed.

By emulating this GCC blueprint for social and political repression, Kadyrov has reduced Chechnya to a family-run criminal enterprise beset by human rights violations. Among the reasons the Russian security services view Kadyrov with suspicion is the austere brand of Islam he has imported to Russia, one that is alien to Russia’s own long-established majority Muslim republics, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.

At the same time, carrying out heavy-duty negotiations with the ideologically-aligned Gulf monarchs over the Kremlin’s head has ruptured Kadyrov’s relationship with Putin. Upon facing a sudden health scare in mid-2023, Kadyrov flew in Dr. Yasseen Ibrahim Al-Shahat — a nephrologist at Abu Dhabi’s Burjeel Hospital — and underwent follow-up treatment for kidney failure in Dubai.

That curious decision lays bare the ballooning trust deficit between Grozny and Moscow, not least as the UAE lacks sophisticated healthcare facilities itself and often sends its own ailing citizens abroad for medical care on the government’s dime. To avoid coming across as weak in the eyes of the Chechen masses and sparking palace intrigue, Kadyrov is more concerned with shrouding his existing illness in secrecy than prolonging whatever time he has left.

Considering how inaccessible the UAE is to foreign media and investigative reporters, the likelihood of Kadyrov’s diagnosis being leaked was far lower than it was in Russia. In terms of internal stability, the UAE cemented its reputation as a regional sanctuary during the recent Israel-Iran conflagration and the US-led airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. That Tehran chose to retaliate against a US military base in Qatar instead of a facility it uses in the UAE proves just how effective the Emirati leadership’s “zero problems” foreign policy doctrine has been at insulating its territory from outside aggression.

Of greater significance to Kadyrov, however, is the UAE’s sway over Western powers and penchant for punching above its weight on the international stage. If anything, Abu Dhabi’s ‘Bani Fatima’ brothers are in pole position to lobby for sanctions relief on his behalf by virtue of their cosy ties with the Trump administration and their pledge to invest $1.4 trillion in the US economy over the next decade.

Moreover, the UAE hosts CENTCOM’s Al-Dhafra Air Base, a military installation specialised in air combat operations, reconnaissance missions as well as intelligence gathering with roughly 1,200 active American troops. and has been designed a major US defence partner along with India. It’s worth recalling that the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control de-listed Kadyrov’s Dubai-domiciled horse trainer Satish Seemar from the Global Magnitsky Sanctions List in 2023 thanks to intervention from Emirati higher-ups.

Whereas Kadyrov’s previous attempts at relinquishing stewardship of Chechnya were largely performative and a means of extracting concessions from Putin, he appears genuinely intent on escaping accountability and sailing off into the sunset this time around. Should that be the case, the United Arab Emirates fits the bill seamlessly.