Mission creep

But Russia’s growing presence in Libya has set off alarm bells among European policymakers. Meloni recently warned that Russian missiles could soon be placed there — just a few hundred miles from Europe’s southern shores — potentially turning the country into a new front in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against the West.

While Meloni may have played up sensational newspaper headlines for dramatic effect, her concern was well-founded. Since 2020, Russia has systematically built a network of military facilities across Libya, in what is arguably Putin’s most effective foreign-influence operation to date. By turning Libya into a forward operating base, Russia has gained a strategic platform to extend its influence into Africa, forge new diplomatic alliances, and control a smuggling superhighway that can be weaponised against Europe.

Intelligence analysts have identified the web of Russian-operated airbases in Libya as a central pillar of the Kremlin’s African campaign. Most notably, these bases have supported Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces in their brutal war against the Sudanese Armed Forces and helped maintain Russia’s long-running but underreported reign of terror in the Central African Republic.

Russia’s increased military presence in Libya has also enabled it to bolster its influence in the so-called Sahelian “coup belt” of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso — a trio of unstable authoritarian regimes that have withdrawn from the Western-aligned Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to form the Alliance of Sahel States.

Russia’s entry into the Sahel has catalyzed Europe’s expulsion from the region. By stoking anti-Western sentiment through disinformation campaigns, Russia has fuelled public demand for the expulsion of France and other European powers while presenting itself as an alternative security provider. That dynamic is now repeating itself in Chad, the latest target of Putin’s influence campaign.

But despite its bombastic propaganda, Russia’s security assistance has been weak and often counterproductive, contributing to a surge in jihadist violence and terrorist activity that has inflicted heavy losses on Russian mercenaries.

In addition to formal partnerships, Russia has gained economic rewards through informal channels. The Russian-backed looting of state resources and the smuggling networks that thrive behind a thin veneer of state control overwhelmingly benefit ruling elites. The Haftar family — Russia’s main proxies in Libya — is a prime example. Unlike many of Russia’s other African allies, the Haftars preside over a de facto fiefdom, rather than a recognised state.

Indeed, Libyan National Army commander and self-proclaimed “field marshal” Khalifa Haftar is a warlord with no formal or legal authority, yet he wields brutal control over southern and eastern Libya with Russia’s backing and in recent years, the family has ensured that Russian bases are as effective at extracting wealth as they are at importing military assets.

Russia has also used the Haftars to fragment Libya’s oil industry. In 2022, in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin orchestrated an oil blockade to drive up global prices. Later, Libya’s oil sector served as a conduit for Russian fuel exports, helping to smuggle Russia’s sanctioned oil products into Europe (costing European governments vast sums in lost tax revenue) or redirect them to support Russia’s other African proxies.

But Russia isn’t just using Libya to finance its war in Ukraine and undermine Europe’s response. Through its alliance with the Haftar family, Russia has established a vast criminal infrastructure that it rents out to drug and arms dealers, human traffickers, and smugglers. This network has also enabled Russia to weaponise migration against Europe, simultaneously boosting the Haftars’ legitimacy and sowing political discord across the continent. Meanwhile, the Haftars, who are eager to expand their smuggling operation into a regional enterprise, have begun formalising deals with neighbouring countries.

In many ways, Libya and the Haftar alliance are the linchpin of Putin’s new foreign-policy strategy. Known as the Karaganov doctrine after Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov, this strategy portrays Russia as an anti-colonial liberator intent on democratising the global order by rallying non-Western countries against the West. The irony, of course, is that Russia’s anti-colonial project is built on war crimes, coups, and the extraction of African wealth to benefit Russian elites.

In February, members of the Haftar family travelled to Minsk, where they finalised an agreement to develop the port of Tobruk. Landlocked Belarus may seem like an unlikely partner for a port-development project, but the true value of the deal lies in giving Russia effective control over a new Mediterranean harbour and propping up a loyal ally.

While it is hardly surprising that Russia would exploit Libya’s geostrategic position and oil wealth, it is less clear why Europe has allowed the Kremlin to establish a foothold on its doorstep. European governments must act swiftly before the threat becomes even harder to contain.

Fortunately, policymakers are not without options. Sanctioning and freezing the accounts of Russian smugglers, targeting shell companies operating cargo flights into Russian bases, applying universal jurisdiction, and supporting prosecutions through the International Criminal Court are relatively straightforward steps that could severely undermine Russia’s efforts to destabilise Europe.

That said, to protect its vulnerable southern flank, Europe must do more than merely contain Russia’s influence. It must also offer a credible alternative. Helping to protect Libya’s oil industry from criminal exploitation would be a good start. Most importantly, European governments must finally deliver on their promises to facilitate Libya’s democratic transition — a commitment that has been repeated time and again, but never fulfilled.