Propping up the home front

Instead, night after night Russia continues to launch hundreds of drones and missiles at Ukraine, killing civilians and destroying homes, public buildings and infrastructure.

Russia can only continue this war if it has enough workers. It has one of the world’s largest armed forces (composed of 1.32 million active military personnel), but its military recruiters face a challenging job in outpacing the enormous losses of soldiers who are killed or seriously injured in Ukraine.

However, the staffing needs of Russia’s military are tiny compared with its defence industry. Russian factories that produce weapons and equipment for the war employ approximately 4 million workers — and they have been suffering from a serious labour shortage.

According to a statement made in the Russian parliament in 2024, the country’s defence industry needs approximately 400,000 more workers than it currently employs.

But how can Russia, with a population of 143 million people have a labour shortage in a sector of the economy that is so crucial for the war?

There are a variety of reasons. An estimated 1 million Russian citizens fled Russia in 2022 — either because they opposed the war in principle or because they wanted to avoid being forced to join the military and fight — or both. Although as many as 45% of those who fled are believed to have returned to Russia over the past three years, that would mean Russia lost approximately 650,000 people from its workforce, at least for the duration of the war and perhaps permanently.

Russia’s defence industry is also in direct competition with the army for workers. The Russian state has substantially increased the salaries and various benefits that it offers to new military recruits. Salaries of 200,000 rubles — more than €2,000 — a month are typical, putting combat soldiers in the top 10% of Russia’s earners.

The defence industry has had to raise the wages it offers during the war, increasing average salaries by 65% between 2022 and 2024, up to about 89,700 rubles (€900) per month. New recruits to the military, however, can expect a one-off signing bonus of as much as 4 million rubles in addition to their monthly salary.

Demographic patterns also play a part. There was a sharp drop in the birth rate in Russia in the 1990s, which means there are fewer people in their 20s and 30s seeking employment.

The defence industry has introduced a number of initiatives since the start of Russia’s mass invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to cope with the increased demand for the production of new weapons and equipment along with the need to repair damaged and broken military hardware.

Many facilities are working around the clock: introducing compulsory 12-hour shifts and work weeks of six days on, one day off. Other parts of the defence industry are reportedly using inmates from local prisons to fill staffing gaps, including Uralvagonzavod, which is Russia’s largest manufacturer of tanks.

Russia has turned to ally North Korea to fill some of its military and labour shortages. Thousands of Koreans have been sent to Russia to work in factories and in construction, as part of a deal between Putin and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un. There have been reports of “slave labour” conditions and 18-hour days. North Koreans have also been sent to bolster the Russian military.

Despite all the shortages, the military industry is not recruiting Russia’s women to work in most roles. Although some Russian women do work in the defence industry, labour regulations introduced in the 1970s exclude women from many roles that are important to defence production, such as working with hazardous chemicals or heavy metals.

These restrictions are designed to protect pregnant women and the fertility of future mothers. Considering Putin’s emphasis on increasing the birth rate and on presenting Russia as a bastion of traditional gender roles, this is unlikely to change.

However, the reluctance to recruit Russian women into jobs in the defence industry does not extend to women from other countries. Around 200 women, mainly from central and west Africa, have been hired to work in defence industry factories located in the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan, a Russian republic located east of Moscow. Many of these factories build drones assembled from components imported from Iran — weapons that have been used extensively by Russia in its attacks on civilians in Ukraine.

The African women employed to build drones in Tatarstan were recruited through a programme called Alabuga Start, which targets young female migrant workers.

It is advertised extensively on social media, including through paid influencers on TikTok. The salaries offered are high in relation to the wages that these women could earn in their own countries. However, Alabuga Start recruits earn around 40,000 rubles (€400) a month — less than half the amount that Russian defence industry workers receive.

The programme is focused on recruiting foreign women for a mix of practical, financial reasons and gender stereotypes. African women will work for less money than Russians. They are also believed to be easier to control than foreign men, while women are perceived to be better than men at tasks that require patience and precision.

The Alabuga Start website appears to offer an attractive package of work experience, on-the-job training, accommodation, Russian language lessons and free flights to Russia. The sectors for employment identified include catering, hospitality and service jobs with no mention of drone assembly.

However, once they arrive, the young women can find themselves living very different lives to those they had anticipated. There are reports of working long hours and exposure to dangerous chemicals, with passports being withheld to prevent women from leaving. For instance, Kenya has launched an investigation into Alabuga Start, which may see the programme shut down in that country.

The difficulties of recruiting and retaining labour for Russia’s defence industry, including bringing in foreign migrant workers and their treatment, reveal some serious weaknesses in Moscow’s military planning. While those are probably not enough to stop Russia’s war effort, they do indicate some of the strains that the war is placing on the country’s economy.